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In an economic geography model with firm heterogeneity, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) show that regional 
policies for promoting periphery development attract low-productivity firms and adversely affect the 
productivity gap within a country. This paper empirically examines their theoretical prediction by using 
plant-level data during active relocation policies in Japan. Our estimation results from plant-level regressions 
and propensity-score matching that are generally consistent with the theory. Compared to other regions, those 
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1. Introduction 
Uneven development of regions within a country has been a serious social concern. To alleviate 
this problem, governments often adopt policies that promote the relocation of firms from 
industrial centers to undeveloped areas. By constructing a new economic geography model with 
firm heterogeneity, however, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) show that relocation subsidies for 
increasing the share of industry in periphery regions “attract the least productive firms since 
they have the lowest opportunity cost of leaving the agglomerated region” (p.2). If their 
theoretical prediction is true, regional policies should unintentionally widen the productivity gap 
between the core and the periphery.
1 This paper, the first empirical investigation of the sorting 
effect of regional policy, exploits plant-level data derived from manufacturing censuses during 
the period of active relocation policies in Japan. 
Japanese industrial relocation policy can be regarded as a rare, suitable case for testing 
this theoretical prediction. First, all the regional policy programs considered in this paper are 
designed to relocate manufacturing plants from congested industrial core regions to 
undeveloped rural regions within a country, as formalized by Baldwin and Okubo (2006). In 
contrast, regional policies in other countries or other periods have been carried out for different 
objectives (e.g., the four Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund to fight unemployment and 
stimulate economic growth in the poor regions in EU member countries and to support the 
transition of Eastern Europe into the EU). Second, Japan is not a federated country; instead, 
regional and local administrative units (prefecture, city, town, or village) possess only limited 
fiscal and judicial autonomy. This institutional fact implies that we can safely study the effects 
                                                  
1  In another example of theoretical work on the unintended effects of regional policy, Depont and 
Martin (2006) show that regional policies, especially subsidies to poor regions proportional to firms’ 
profits financed by national taxes, increase cross-regional income inequality within a country. Their 
argument rests on the observation that the effect of subsidy spills over to rich regions, where many 
owners of capital (beneficiary of subsidized profits) reside. 3 
 
of relocation policy on plants in the country by investigating the programs undertaken by the 
national government alone. In other countries, various layers of public authority (e.g., the states 
and the federal government in the U.S.A., and the nations and the European Commission of 
Europe) undertake their respective regional policies. Finally, Japan has accumulated experience 
in many regional subsidy programs, and the country has maintained rich regional data sets at the 
plant level. As discussed in the next section, the Japanese government actively tried to relocate 
plants from crowded industrial centers to peripheral regions particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This makes Japan a good case by which to study regional policy impacts. In addition, the 
Japanese government has been consistently collecting comprehensive information on all 
manufacturing plants across all regions of the country. By making use of plant-level data 
derived from consecutive waves of manufacturing censuses, we can trace the effects of these 
economic policies in Japan.   
While the list of global policy experiences over time is long, this issue remains vital in 
many countries. In Europe, the EU Structural Funds have had a substantial impact on the 
relocation of industries to peripheral countries in the last decade. However, as discussed by 
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002), regional policies result in attracting R&D intensive 
sectors to periphery regions with less skilled labor endowments. This tendency acts as a counter 
to comparative advantage and consequently fails to stimulate peripheral economic development. 
Previous empirical studies found that regional policies have not significantly raised productivity, 
although none has discussed the within-country productivity gap. For example, Boldrin and 
Canova (2001) and Dall’erba and Gallo (2007) detect no positive impacts of EU regional 
policies on productivity. In respective countries in Europe, Criscuolo et al. (2007) on U.K. 
Regional Selective Assistance and Martin et al. (2008) on the French regional cluster policy 
have found that supported firms/plants are not significantly different in terms of productivity. 4 
 
None of these previous studies, however, have addressed the core-periphery productivity gap 
within a country. 
More generally, the recent issue of the World Bank’s influential World Development 
Report (2009), titled “Reshaping Economic Geography,” argues that the side effects of regional 
development policy are becoming more serious in the age of globalization. When a country 
becomes more open to international trade “without changing the level of permissible subsidies 
to firms in remote regions, the subsidies will lead to an increasing distortion of the spatial 
allocation for industry” (Baldwin et al., 2003, p. 478). In this sense, while we examine only the 
case of Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, this investigation of a traditional relocation policy 
has far broader significance for our age. 
The main results of our study are as follows. All regional policy programs are able to 
attract plants to targeted regions. However, plants located in these regions have below-average 
productivity. By using a matching technique and comparing pairs of plants in targeted and 
non-targeted regions, we find that all regional policies always attract significantly lower 
productivity plants. The results are quite robust. Even if we use only the sample of the 
machinery sectors or of mother cities in targeted regions, the principal outcomes remain 
unchanged. 
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the 
history of relocation policies in Japan. Section 3 describes the plant-level data acquired for our 
study. Section 4 explains our empirical methods. Section 5 reports the estimation results from 
regressions and propensity score matching. Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Overview of the relocation policy in Japan 5 
 
This section, a historical summary of Japan’s industrial relocation policy after World War II, is 
not presented as a comprehensive history but as a brief and sketchy background explanation for 
our estimations. It centers on the policy experience of Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, which 
provides us with a valuable opportunity to test the theoretical prediction of Baldwin and Okubo 
(2006). 
Before discussing relocation policies, it would be informative to quickly scan the 
evolution of Japan’s economic geography after World War II. As described by Fujita and 
Tabuchi (1997), the Japanese economic landscape has experienced two major transformations: 
first, the shift from the traditional Tokyo-Osaka bipolar system to the Pacific Industrial Belt 
during the historic high-growth period of the 1960s, and second, the move to a regional system 
dominated by monopolar Tokyo after the oil crisis in the mid-1970s. Labor reallocation was 
substantial from the agricultural sector in the periphery toward manufacturing industries on the 
Pacific Ocean coast during the first transformation period, whereas Tokyo attracted central 
management functions and service industries during the second period. Behind this geographic 
conversion, Japan also experienced changes in its industrial structure, which transitioned from 
one dominated by heavy industries dependent on imported materials to one led by 
knowledge-intensive, high-tech industries. 
During this period, the Japanese government was involved in a series of active initiatives 
designed to encourage the relocation of firms from heaving manufacturing centers to 
undeveloped periphery regions. While it gradually shrank during the high economic growth of 
the 1960s and early 1970s, the wide income gap between the core (the Pacific Industrial Belt, 
especially Tokyo and Osaka) and the periphery has remained one of the top priorities in the 
economic policy package. Social concerns, such as air pollution, commuting congestion, and 
soaring housing prices in core regions, promoted public supports for nationwide industrial 6 
 
repositioning. The government’s long-term regional policy plan emphasized “balanced 
development” of regions. As Japan is not a federated nation, the central national government has 
a strong authority in many policy arenas, including regional development policy. Under the 
leadership of the central government, transport infrastructure systems, such as highways and 
railroads, have been developed to facilitate the relocation from high-density center regions. The 
industrial relocation policy programs considered in this paper are among these grand strategy 
packages. 
Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficients of two-digit manufacturing sectors for 47 prefectures 
from the 1970s to the present.
2 Cross-regional variations are measured in terms of the number 
of plants, employees, and value added. All three Gini coefficients decline over time. In 
particular, the Gini coefficients in terms of plants and employees steadily decline until the 
mid-1990s. This indicates that manufacturing geographically became diversified across 
Japanese regions because of factors such as improvement of the infrastructure and highway 
network as well as regional development policies. 
In this paper, we study several regional development policy initiatives. First, we examine 
the Industrial Relocation Subsidy, which subsidizes plants relocated from “the moving-out 
promotion areas”
3 to “the inducement areas”
4 (both areas explicitly defined by national 
government orders). Since almost all the regions in Japan are categorized under one or the other 
of these categories, this policy program should have a wide impact on Japanese industrial 
relocations. This subsidy program has a long history, dating back to 1972, and was stimulated 
                                                  
2  The data are taken from Manufacturing Census (Report by Industries) for each year (METI). 
3  The areas from which plants are encouraged to leave (iten-sokushin chi-iki in Japanese) are mainly 
in and around Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. 
4  The areas to which plants are encouraged to relocate (yudo chi-iki in Japanese) include almost all 
areas outside the three major industrial centers. 7 
 
by serious congestions in industrial centers; these congestions were aggravated during the 
high-growth years of the 1960s. 
Second, we examine the program Technopolis, started in 1983 and designed to form 
high-technology industrial complexes (e.g., machinery sectors). During the 1960s, Japan 
encouraged heavy industries, including petrochemicals, which depended on cheap imported oil. 
However, the national government, after the oil price hikes in the 1970s, tried to shift the 
country’s industrial configuration from heavy to high-technology industries. The Technopolis 
plan was expected to play a pivotal role in transforming the countrywide industrial structure, 
while, at the same time, encouraging more balanced growth across regions through the 
establishment of new industry complexes in undeveloped areas.   
In addition to these two governmental programs, we also include the following three 
initiatives, all of which were designed to support rural regions with declining manufacturing. 
While Technopolis emphasized high technology, manufacturing industries (firms developing 
high technology or manufacturing high-technology products, for example, machinery) remain 
the policy target. The additional three programs focus, instead, on non-manufacturing activities, 
such as software programming or scientific research that, although closely related to and 
intended to support manufacturing industries in the same region, reflect the historical shift in 
Japanese industrial structures. 
Started in 1988, Intelligent Location (zuno ritti in Japanese)
5 is designed to attract 
software and information service industries, which critically support the progression of high 
technology-intensive manufacturing.
6 Although expanding its scope to information-related 
                                                  
5  As the original Japanese names of policy programs (shown in parentheses) have been translated by 
the authors, some of the English names are not officially authorized. 
6  As this program started relatively late in our sample period, our analysis is limited to OLS 
estimations. 8 
 
non-manufacturing activities, this program shares the fundamental policy objective with the 
preceding Technopolis in stimulating regional manufacturing.   
Regional Hub City (chiho kyoten toshi in Japanese) began in 1992 and was created to 
attract regional headquarters. While the repositioning programs of earlier periods often tried to 
relocate manufacturing plants to alleviate congestion and pollution in urban areas, this plan 
focuses on regional headquarter offices. Its changed perspective is again in line with the general 
trend of the declining share of manufacturing in the Japanese economy. This program was 
initially started as part of a regional infrastructure development plan. However, by changing the 
office locations, the Regional Hub City program is likely to have an indirect effect on the 
locations of manufacturing plants owned by the same firm and those of others competing in the 
same markets. 
Science City (gakuen toshi in Japanese) is designed to attract academic and research 
facilities. A prime example of this program is Tsukuba City, in which a national university was 
relocated from urban Tokyo as part of a comprehensive development plan for a new city. 
Integral to a national research policy, this program started in the early 1970s. However, since 
Japanese economic planning in the 1980s began to focus more on R&D, science, and 
technology than on production per se, the Science City program should be examined together 
with other industrial relocation programs.
7 
Finally, we consider Coal Mining Areas (san tan chi-iki in Japanese). Started in 1961, this 
policy program is intended to help industries in coal-mining regions. Although this initiative 
began much earlier than any of the others already mentioned, the political commitment to it has 
been strong and sustained. Japan had traditionally depended on domestic coal as the primary 
source of energy, until cheap oil imports started to expand in the late 1950s. Following this 
                                                  
7  For example, Technopolis requires each targeted regions to have at least one university with an 
engineering department. 9 
 
fundamental shift in demand, called the Energy Revolution, coal-mining areas, once populous 
and rich, entered a declining phase. The Japanese government supported these declining regions 
by providing funds to promote other industries in them. As this program clearly identifies the 
targeted regions, as the funds devoted to this program were far greater than those allocated to 
others and as manufacturing industries were often expected to develop in these regions, we 
decided to include the Coal Mining Areas program in our analysis.   
As we examine the above policies, all mandated by national law, the targeted regions are 
explicitly defined by public ordinance documents. Whether or not the region is selected by each 
policy is identified at the most basic geographical unit (village, town, or city). Any region in 
Japan belongs to one village, town, or city exclusively. No more meticulous official 
geographical unit exists in the Japanese system. While most of the previous studies depend on 
broader prefecture or state-level data, our identification of target regions at the city/town/village 
level is far more complete and precise.
8 
 
3. Description of plant-level data 
This section describes the data used in our study. We derive plant-level data from Japan’s 
Census of Manufacturers. Basic plant characteristics, such as output (shipment), employment 
(number of regular workers), and expenditures on materials, are included in this census for 
virtually all plants across all manufacturing industries. 
 
3.1. Coverage of plants 
                                                  
8  In some exceptional cases, targeted regions are defined by chome addresses (similar to street 
numbers) within the same city/town/village. As our plant data cannot identify a plant’s chome 
address, we assume that all firms located in a city/town/village are subsidized if some parts of the 
city/town/village are targeted by a policy. 10 
 
Although the annual survey covers plants above the given size threshold, small-sized plants are 
only included in the “census years” (year with 0, 3, 5, or 8 as its last digit). We concentrate on 
the census years to avoid truncations due to the sampling of plants. As plant-level data are 
maintained only for the plants with no less than five employees in the original micro-data files 
of the central government, even for the most recent census, our sample excludes plants with less 
than five employees. Since these extremely small-sized plants produce negligible volumes of 
output, their omission is unlikely to affect our conclusion on economic geography. 
     Among the available plant-level data, this paper focuses on plants owned by multi-plant 
firms. The census captures whether or not each plant is a part of a multi-plant firm, although no 
identifier is available for linking plants under the same ownership. Hence, the aggregation of 
our plant-level data to the firm level is impossible. We look at multi-plant firms because they are 
likely to relocate their plants more responsively to variations in economic geography conditions 
and in the government’s subsidy. By focusing on these relatively “footloose” plants, this paper 
sheds light on the possible effects of the relocation policy on plant productivity. Our sample of 
plants owned by multi-plant firms includes 48,000 plants in 1978 and then steadily grows to 
66,000 by 1990 (Table 1).   
 
3.2. Sample period 
Our sample period consists of the following six consecutive census years: 1978, 1980, 1983, 
1985, 1988, and 1990. We selected these years for the following reasons.   
First, as mentioned in Section 2, the 1970s and 1980s were the heyday of Japan’s active 
relocation policies. In later years, the focus of Japanese regional initiatives shifted from 
manufacturing to non-manufacturing activities. Although this shift naturally reflects changing 
shares in the national economy, the government’s efforts on gathering data on 11 
 
non-manufacturing (service) sectors are generally insufficient when compared to the extensive 
censuses carried out on the manufacturing sector. Public support programs have also begun to 
concentrate more on functions, such as R&D, rather than on specific locations. Furthermore, 
greater emphasis was placed on strengthening the roles of Tokyo as a global financial center, 
especially during the Bubble boom period around 1990. After the bubble burst, public 
construction projects were actively financed in rural areas as part of macroeconomic stimulus 
during the 1990s but without the policy objective of industrial relocation. Consequently, to 
avoid these various contaminations in recent years when testing the productivity-sorting effect 
by Baldwin and Okubo (2006), we focus on the earlier period when policy programs for 
relocating manufacturing plants from crowded core areas to undeveloped periphery areas were 
actively undertaken. 
Second, the 1970s and 1980s are suitable periods to measure the impact of regional policy 
on firm relocation across Japan. From the 1990s onward, unprecedented exchange rate 
appreciation led factories to relocate to lower wage Asian countries through foreign direct 
investment. More recently, production processes and firm organization have become much 
more complex. Many Japanese firms build production networks linked to domestic and 
overseas production by intermediate inputs purchase, foreign direct investment, and 
outsourcing. Since complete data sets covering global location information of individual plants 
are not available, we cannot appropriately examine regional policies in such a globalized era. 
To circumvent the statistical difficulties that arise from the complexity of firm organization and 
oversea production/relocation, we focus on the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, the Census of 
Manufacturers does not maintain plant-level data before the mid-1970s, even in the original 
government data files. 12 
 
As no plant identifier tracing micro-data over time is available, our data set is 
unfortunately in the format of repeated cross-sections. As a result, we cannot discuss causality 
direction or dynamic effects on entry/exit or on productivity growth. In addition, without any 
longitudinal identifier in our repeated cross-section data, we cannot estimate the total factor 
productivity of each firm. Furthermore, previous research in related fields shows that the choice 
of productivity measure is unlikely to affect results.
9 Therefore, we measure productivity by 




          During this period, the regions targeted by policies attracted plants. As Table 1 shows, the 
number of plants located in targeted regions increased substantially. Furthermore, this growth in 
the targeted regions is higher than the national average. As a result, the share of target regions in 




The above table demonstrates that the share of targeted regions has increased during a series of 
relocation policy programs. This finding, reported in Table 2, is robust, even if we concentrate 
on the regions actually subsidized among the inducement areas listed by the law.
10 However, 
                                                  
9  For example, Bernard and Jones (1996) report that the difference between TFP and labor 
productivity is relatively small when countries are compared. Syverson (2004) also confirms that his 
result from TFP on the plant-level relation between productivity and spatial competition is robust 
even if labor productivity is used. 
10  Staffs at Regional Economy Section in METI rearranged the historical data on individual subsidy 
provision after deleting firm identifiers and provided them to the authors exclusively for this 
research project. 13 
 
the mere rise in the number of plants does not imply the success of these relocation policies. We 
will examine their impacts on productivity, especially at the plant level. 
 
4. Empirical methods 
This section explains the empirical methods used to estimate the impact of relocation policies 
on plant productivity. We take two different approaches. First, we estimate the regressions with 
the policy dummy variable. Second, we select comparable plants on the basis of the propensity 
score matching method. 
 
4.1. Policy Premium 
In the first approach, to estimate the policy premium on plant productivity, we estimate the 
following plant-level reduced-form regression: 
j m m l l k k
j j j j
PREF IND POLICY
LABOR MAT SIZE const PROD
ε δ γ β
α α α
+ + + +
+ + + =
∑ ∑ ∑
3 2 1
.   (1) 
The plant is indexed by j. As no longitudinal plant identifier linking plants over time is available, 
all the regressions are in a cross-sectional format. The dependent variable is the productivity 
PROD, which is defined by the value added per worker.
11  Included on the right-hand side of the 
regression are plant characteristics, industry dummies (IND), prefecture dummies (PREF), and 
relocation policy dummies (POLICY).
12 Plant-level variables included in (1) are the plant size, 
SIZE (the number of workers), the intensity of material used, MAT (expenditures on materials 
divided by output, both in yen), and the labor intensity LABOR (labor inputs [total wage paid] 
                                                  
11  The denominator is the number of regular employees. The numerator is output (shipment) less the 
consumption tax, depreciation, and raw material costs. 
12  The policy dummy takes the value of 1 for the regions always targeted through the sample period. 
As a robustness check, however, the dummy for the regions targeted at each year (not necessarily 
targeted in other years) is also used in the cases of Technolopolis and Intelligent Location.   14 
 
divided by output). All variables are in logarithmic form.
13 No other plant-level variables 
related to productivity, such as capital, are available in our census data that include small-sized 
plants.
14 Industries are defined at a two-digit level. The dummies for 47 prefectures are 
included to control for region-specific determinants of plant productivity, such as cross-regional 
differences in human capital. The error term is expressed by ε in (1). POLICY is a vector of 
dummy variables, which takes the value of 1 when the plant is located in the region (city, town, 
or village) targeted by each relocation policy program.
15  If the coefficient on a policy dummy is 
positive/negative, the plants located in the regions targeted by the policy are,  on average, 
more/less productive than those located in other regions after controlling for plant 
characteristics, industry effects, and prefecture-specific factors. We must note, however, that we 
should not interpret equation (1) as indicating the direction of causality. As our sample is 
constrained as repeated cross-sections, we cannot discuss dynamics or causality appropriately. 
 
4.2. Matching Technique (Treatment Effect) 
While the regression discussed above is straightforward, plants located in the regions targeted 
by policy may differ, because of reasons not related to the policy, from those located in other 
regions in terms of productivity-related critical variables. In response to this selectivity problem, 
we choose the matching technique to select a pair of comparable plants from our sample.   
The causal effect of the treatment is estimated as the mean difference in productivity 
between the treated and the untreated groups. The treated group is composed of the plants 
located in the targeted regions (city, town, or village level) identified by regional development 
policy programs. On the other hand, the non-treated group is a set of all plants outside the target 
                                                  
13 For  MAT and LABOR, the value of 1 is added before taking the logarithm. 
14  The manufacturing census contains data on tangible fixed assets only for large-sized plants. 
15  The policy dummy is defined time-invariant, irrespective of the start and finish of each policy. 15 
 
regions. The average effect of the treatment on the treated group, ATT, is given by 
) 1 | (
0 1 = − D y y E , where D is the policy dummy variable (D = 1 if plants are treated, and 0 
otherwise).
1 y and
0 y denote treated and non-treated plant-level productivity respectively. We 
assume that the non-treated outcomes are independent of treatment status and conditional on 
observable plant characteristics, X ) , , ( Labor Mat Size ∈ . The Size, Mat, and Labor capture all 
relevant differences between the two groups. Then, we adopt the propensity score matching as 
in Rosenbaum and Robin (1983). The probability of treatment, p(X), defined as the propensity 
score (0 < p < 1), given the observables is specified as ) | 1 ( ) ( X D p X p = ≡ . The propensity 
score is estimated by probit regression using X. To match the sample, we use caliper matching at 
the level of 0.05 and involve one-to-one matching with replacement with common support.
16 
For a pre-specified δ (= 0.05), treated plant i is matched to the non-treated plant j such 
that } { min
} 0 { j i D k j i p p p p − = − >
= ∈ δ . When none of the non-treated units are within δ from 
treated plant i, the plant remains unmatched. The expected difference between matched pairs is 
given by )) ( ( )) ( , 0 ( )) ( , 1 | (
0 1 X p y y E X p D y E X p D y E − = = − = . 
By iterated expectations, the average across the distribution of propensity scores 
gives ) (
0 1 y y E ATT − = . To check whether a pair of sample has similar characteristics, X, we 
use a balance test. The test checks whether independent variables used in the above-mentioned 
probit regression to derive propensity score are significantly different, on average, between 
treated and non-treated groups. After matching the pair, when the gaps in almost all the average 
variables between two groups are insignificant in a t-statistic, we succeed in pair matching 
identical characteristics. 
 
                                                  
16  In our regression, common support is imposed on the treated units. Because of the common 
support, the treated units whose propensity score is higher than the largest propensity score in the 
non-treated group can remain unmatched. 16 
 
5. Estimation results 
5.1. Results from regression with dummies 
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 3a. This regression exercise is intended to 
examine whether targeted regions tend to have an average productivity that is significantly 
higher than that of other regions. We estimate cross-sectional regressions for all years in our 
sample period irrespective of the starting period of each policy, with the policy dummy variable 





The results shown in Table 3a demonstrate that the plants located in the regions 
targeted by most relocation policy programs tend to have significantly lower productivity or to 
be insignificantly different from plants located in regions not promoted by the policy. Negative 
coefficients are found especially in the cases of Regional Hub Cities and Science Cities. The 
regions targeted by these policy programs appear to attract low-productivity plants. 
Consequently, we find empirical evidence favorable for the sorting effect predicted by Baldwin 
and Okubo (2006) in these policy programs. We must note, however, that this negative effect on 
manufacturing productivity should not be regarded as a policy failure, since these two programs 
are intended to attract regional headquarter offices and academic/research facilities respectively, 
not productive manufacturing plants. In addition, we should not directly consider the OLS 
regression results as showing the causal effects of policy. We will later discuss the treatment 
effect on the basis of plant matching. 
                                                  
17  The targeted region is strictly defined as the regions that have always been targeted since the start 
of each policy program.   17 
 
          In contrast, in the cases of Technopolis and Intelligent Locations, the positive productivity 
premium is found. However, we cannot assert simply on the basis of this regression result that 
these two policy schemes are exceptionally successful in attracting high-productivity firms. By 
comparing the productivity premium of the targeted regions before and after the start of the 
policy program, we can infer the policy effect. As reported in the table, the magnitude remains 
the same over time and the gap had been significant even before these policy programs started 
(Technopolis from 1983, Intelligent Locations from 1988). Thus, the results indicate that these 
two programs have selected regions in which higher productivity plants were already 
concentrated and/or average productivity was higher than the total for Japan.
18  In this sense, we 
should be cautious in concluding that these two programs succeed in attracting productive 
plants. 
As a robustness check, for Technopolis and Intelligent Locations, we further introduce an 
alternative definition of a targeted region. In the above regressions, we have defined targeted 
regions as those targeted consistently through the sample period since the start of the policy 
program. We now alternatively define them as the regions targeted at each year (not necessarily 
targeted in other years). The former definition concentrates on the narrower groups of regions 
common across years, but the latter definition includes newly targeted regions in regressions on 
later years. The estimation results based on this alternative definition are shown in Table 3b. The 
regressions based on the latter definition are naturally limited to the years after the start of each 
policy program, though the regression based on the former can be estimated in any year during 
the sample period, as shown in the previous table. In both Technopolis and Intelligent Locations, 
the productivity of plants in the targeted regions are, on average, significantly lower at the 
                                                  
18  As a related finding, Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) report that the EU Structural Fund 
supports are effective in Ireland, where the share of high-skilled workers is higher than other 
targeted countries. 18 
 
beginning of policies, though the premium turns to be positive in later years. Thus, this 
additional regression result rather strengthens our previous conclusion. 
 
5.2. Matching results 
Our main interest is to estimate the impact of regional policy programs directly. Table 4 reports 
ATT in the matching result. To discuss the periods before and after policy impact, we estimate 
ATT before starting policies in some programs in which treated groups are firms in regions to be 
targeted in the future but not yet subsidized. We note that balance tests pass in all independent 
variables used in the probit estimation in each policy program (See Appendix for a 
representative result).   
As a result, almost all the cases have significantly negative values. Among them, in the 
Industrial Relocation program, the plants in moving-out regions are significantly more 
productive and the comparable plants in the inducement regions are significantly less productive 
at any point in time. Even if we distinguish the inducement regions listed by law and the regions 
actually subsidized, this clear result is confirmed. The signs remain unchanged over time. These 
indicate that the policy program cannot effectively work for high-productive firms to relocate 
from moving-out to inducement regions, although the number of firms increases in the latter. 
Concerning the Technopolis and Intelligent Location programs, values are all significantly 
negative for entire periods. Even after starting programs, the negative values remain unchanged. 
Thus, as in the case of the Industrial Relocation program, the policy impact of these programs is 
nil. Therefore, after controlling for the plant characteristics, we can conclude that all regional 
policy programs fail to attract significantly high-productivity plants. Our finding of no 
productivity effect of regional policies is in line with previous results from other countries (e.g. 19 
 
Curiscuolo et al. 2007 on U.K. and Martin et al. 2008 on Frence), though none has discussed the 
productivity gap within a country. 
 
 (Table  4) 
Endogeneity might, however, affect the results given in Table 4. It is possible that the 
government intentionally subsidizes lower wage regions as a policy response to cross-regional 
income inequality. On the other hand, the plants in high-wage sectors are likely to locate their 
plants in these regions to save labor costs. The low-wage regions, which are likely to be 
subsidized, attract high-wage sectors, but not necessarily because of the subsidy. To control for 
this possible bias, the treatment probability by the probit estimation now takes into account not 
only plant characteristics, X ) , , ( Labor Mat Size ∈ with a two-digit sector dummy, as in Table 4, 
but also the average wage in the region (city/town/village) where the plant is located and the 
average wage in the four-digit industry to which the plant belongs. The probit estimation results 
show that the average wage in the region is significantly negative and the average wage of the 
industry is significantly positive, as expected, in all programs in all years.
19  
(Table 5) 
Using revised propensity scores, ATTs are newly estimated, as reported in Table 5. While 
treatment effects are smaller, most ATTs remain significantly negative. Thus, we confirm that 
the plants in subsidized regions tend to have lower productivity, even after considering this 
possible endogeneity.   
 
5.3. Sensitivity analyses 
                                                  
19  Owing to space constraints, we only report the results for 1980, 1985, and 1990 and omit other 
years. The probit results have also been omitted. The results will be available upon request. 20 
 
This section reports alternative estimation results to check the robustness of our principal 
findings.  
     First,  we  concentrate  on  the  machinery  sector, which was targeted in the Technopolis and 
Intelligent Location policy programs. The machinery sector, which includes automobile, general 
machinery, and electronics, was a growth industry given Japan’s comparative advantage during 
this period. Peripheral regions tried to attract these industries. To avoid possible contaminations 
due to locations by other industries not directly targeted by relocation programs, we estimate the 
same specifications only for the plants in the machinery sector. 
 
    （Table 6） 
The results displayed in Table 6 confirm our previous estimation results from the sample 
covering all sectors (Table 4). Thus, our findings are not affected by industrial compositions.   
Second, we have more detailed information on the structure within each targeted region for 
some policy programs. In the cases of Technopolis and Intelligent Locations, every targeted 
region has its center city (or metropolis).
20 While our previous estimations are based on the 
broad definition of all targeted regions, this section will re-estimate the same specification with 
the policy dummy on the basis of the narrow definition, that is, the targeted region defined by 




The results reported in Table 7 are basically the same as shown previously for all 
targeted regions (Table 4), though the values are small in magnitude. Although no such 
                                                  
20  Each targeted region is designed to develop around a specified bo-toshi (in Japanese), which 
means a mother city (metropolis). 21 
 
information distinguishing center cities within targeted regions is available for other relocation 
programs, the above findings from the two programs confirm the robustness of our previous 
principal findings. 
    Third, we examine the difference between the targeted regions and their adjacent 
(non-subsidized) regions using the data of all sectors. Since regions located adjacently are likely 
to share various unobservable geographical factors, the location decisions of plants may be 
affected by common factors. To isolate the policy effect from these unobservable, possibly 
geographic, factors common to nearby regions, we compare targeted regions with their 
neighbors. Different from the treatment effect estimated in the previous section (Table 4), this 
robustness check restricts the non-treated group only to the regions directly adjacent to those 
that are targeted. 
(Table 8) 
The results reported in Table 8 basically confirm the main findings of the previous section, 
although the statistical significance varies depending on the policy program. In general, even if 
we compare neighboring areas, the plants located in targeted regions tend to be significantly less 
productive than or insignificantly different from the plants located in other regions. The 
Industrial Relocation program shows significantly negative effects in the whole period, whereas 
the effects of Coal Mining Areas and Science Cities are not significant. In comparison, the 
plants in Technopolis or in Intelligent Locations are significantly or insignificantly positive. 
Here, we need to interpret carefully the results from the matching with only those of the 
adjacent regions. Interestingly, after starting policy programs, the treatment effect tends to be 
insignificant. This indicates two possibilities: (1) targeted regions attract more low-productivity 
firms, thus lowering the productivity gap with neighboring regions or (2) relocation to these 
regions might induce some related production in adjacent regions (e.g., parts and components). 22 
 
This spillover effect or backward and forward linkages might reduce the productivity gap 
between targeted and its adjacent regions. 
Summarizing the three estimations for robustness check, we cannot find any significantly 
positive impact of regional policy programs, and thus, these results confirm the robustness of 
our principal findings reported in the previous section.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The results reported in this paper are generally supportive of the theoretical prediction by 
Baldwin and Okubo (2006). All policy programs in Japan can successfully attract firms, both in 
number and share of plants, to targeted regions (Table 1). This may contribute to diversification 
across Japanese regions, as the Gini coefficient has declined over time (Figure 1). However, as 
shown in Table 3, plants located in targeted regions have lower average productivity, although 
productive plants were active in the areas subsidized in Technopolis and Intelligent Locations 
even before the start of these programs. The theory predicts that lower productivity firms are 
likely to relocate to the targeted regions. Once we use the matching technique and compare a 
pair of firms in targeted regions and non-targeted regions, all regional policies are found to 
attract lower productivity firms. We have to be careful about the relationship between the results 
of OLS and matching. The OLS regression discusses average productivity without the causality 
issue, while the propensity score-matching technique singles out pairs and directly compares 
their productivity without using unmatched samples in non-targeted regions.   
Although we have found negative effects of relocation policy on plant productivity, this 
paper is not intended to deny the role of policy in shaping economic geography. The policy 
programs examined in this paper actually result in the location of more plants in targeted 
regions, though the productivity of relocated plants tends to be low. Since the high 23 
 
unemployment rate in undeveloped regions has been a serious policy issue in many mature 
countries, the activated relocations of plants itself should be positively evaluated.
21 We must 
also note that, in spite of our focus on variations within manufacturing, the agriculture sector 
was non-negligible in periphery during earlier period of development and the service sector 
becomes increasingly important in later years.   
The variety of policy schemes is another issue left for future analyses. “The reality is that 
besides place-based incentives, governments have far more potent instruments for integration. 
They can build institutions that unify all places and put in place infrastructure that connects 
some places to others” (World Bank, 2009, p.xxiii). Even within our sample, various policy 
measurers support targeted regions, not necessarily by subsidy. A more detailed analysis that 
distinguishes individual support schemes will enrich our results in the future. 
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value addedTable 1: Basic Statistic
Year Variable  Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1978 PROD 48040 5.844501 1.05994 0 10.59039
SIZE 48040 3.316469 1.280155 1.386294 9.781207
LABOR 48040 0.2345804 0.1613151 0 3.793714
MAT 48040 0.3865969 0.17278 0 5.542666
1980 PROD 48559 5.979857 1.116493 0 10.81911
SIZE 48559 3.310036 1.272666 1.386294 9.795791
LABOR 48559 0.2255405 0.1594183 0 2.939515
MAT 48559 0.3944476 0.1736848 0 3.026459
1983 PROD 53655 6.051981 1.130118 0 11.66635
SIZE 53655 3.276194 1.264586 1.386294 10.05096
LABOR 53655 0.238533 0.1669842 0 3.813525
MAT 53655 0.3843739 0.1739884 0 2.918972
1985 PROD 57942 6.138449 1.120561 0 11.59249
SIZE 57942 3.31352 1.244825 1.386294 10.1092
LABOR 57942 0.2389843 0.165001 0 4.167595
MAT 57942 0.3820283 0.1736199 0 4.973279
1988 PROD 61726 6.237205 1.125369 0 11.79964
SIZE 61726 3.302714 1.230873 1.386294 9.922604
LABOR 61726 0.2429936 0.1755346 0 8.39841
MAT 61726 0.3713824 0.1767701 0 11.35772
1990 PROD 66093 6.347178 1.155394 0 12.44145
SIZE 66093 3.299687 1.21973 1.386294 9.943429
LABOR 66093 0.2383255 0.1720533 0 7.920083
MAT 66093 0.3680061 0.1729084 0 3.832807Table 2: Number of Firms in Targeted Areas
Number of firms located in the targeted areas
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Industrial Relocation moving-out promotion area 10723 10377 11059 11847 11662 12187
inducement areas 16839 17302 18958 20935 22839 24746
Subsidized inducement area 3076 3175 3845 3623 11077 8477
Coal Mining Areas 1263 1258 1430 1339 1375 1455
Technopolis 3423 6210 4053
Intelligent Location 536 6159
Science City 234 222 233 277 285 295
Total 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
Share of firms located in the targeted area in total Japan
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Industrial Relocation moving-out promotion area 0.22321 0.213699 0.206113 0.204463 0.188932 0.184392
inducement areas 0.35052 0.356309 0.353331 0.36131 0.370006 0.374412
Subsidized inducement area 0.06403 0.065384 0.071662 0.062528 0.179454 0.128259
Coal Mining Areas 0.026291 0.025907 0.026652 0.023109 0.022276 0.022014
Technopolis 0.059076 0.100606 0.061323
Intelligent Location 0.008684 0.093187
Science City 0.004871 0.004572 0.004343 0.004781 0.004617 0.004463Table 3a: OLS Results 1 Note: **: 5 % significance, *: 10% significance
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Technopolis  0.0984 0.0897 0.0241 0.0543 0.0505 0.0507
7.62 ** 6.56 ** 1.82 * 4.23 ** 3.94 ** 4.2 **
Size 0.0814 0.1047 0.0979 0.0868 0.0953 0.1003
27.87 ** 33.74 ** 32.58 ** 29.06 ** 31.43 ** 34.67 **
Labor -4.6120 -5.0068 -4.7411 -4.4204 -3.6172 -4.2644
-172.64 ** -173.51 ** -182.07 ** -176.08 ** -159.32 ** -189.48 **
Mat -3.1119 -3.3752 -3.3607 -2.9659 -2.2558 -2.9953
-125.9 ** -128.24 ** -135.46 ** -125.26 ** -101.35 ** -134.5 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4857 0.4862 0.4815 0.4572 0.4158 0.4685
F 1647.25 1674.23 1827.23 1707.86 1589.91 2034.14
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Intelligent  0.1244 0.0989 0.0684 0.0952 0.0888 0.0875
9.74 ** 7.48 ** 5.34 ** 7.58 ** 7.1 ** 7.41 **
Size 0.0810 0.1044 0.0977 0.0866 0.0951 0.1001
27.74 ** 33.64 ** 32.5 ** 28.98 ** 31.37 ** 34.59 **
Labor -4.6084 -5.0050 -4.7394 -4.4192 -3.6150 -4.2637
-172.57 ** -173.45 ** -182.03 ** -176.09 ** -159.25 ** -189.49 **
Mat -3.1114 -3.3752 -3.3604 -2.9668 -2.2563 -2.9972
-125.94 ** -128.26 ** -135.49 ** -125.34 ** -101.41 ** -134.61 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4853 0.4864 0.4817 0.4576 0.4161 0.4688
F 1649.98 1675.19 1829.1 1710.56 1592.2 2036.72
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Moving-out 0.1212 0.1365 0.1457 0.0900 0.1120 0.0976
9.56 ** 10.26 ** 11.58 ** 7.3 ** 8.89 ** 8.14 **
Size 0.0827 0.1061 0.0994 0.0882 0.0971 0.1018
28.31 ** 34.17 ** 33.09 ** 29.47 ** 31.99 ** 35.14 **
Labor -4.6146 -5.0127 -4.7440 -4.4242 -3.6197 -4.2680
-172.78 ** -173.81 ** -182.39 ** -176.26 ** -159.51 ** -189.68 **
Mat -3.1129 -3.3767 -3.3616 -2.9660 -2.2564 -2.9959
-125.98 ** -128.38 ** -135.67 ** -125.31 ** -101.44 ** -134.57 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4861 0.4869 0.4828 0.4576 0.4164 0.4689
F 1649.72 1678.85 1836.92 1710.27 1594.09 2037.51
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Inducement -0.1487 -0.1401 -0.1170 -0.1314 -0.1410 -0.1170
-12.5 ** -11.23 ** -9.64 ** -11.01 ** -11.88 ** -10.44 **
Size 0.0802 0.1036 0.0973 0.0862 0.0948 0.0999
27.5 ** 33.41 ** 32.38 ** 28.85 ** 31.28 ** 34.54 **
Labor -4.6059 -5.0024 -4.7389 -4.4166 -3.6156 -4.2642
-172.57 ** -173.48 ** -182.13 ** -176.07 ** -159.41 ** -189.6 **
Mat -3.1141 -3.3780 -3.3636 -2.9673 -2.2606 -2.9988
-126.12 ** -128.45 ** -135.69 ** -125.43 ** -101.66 ** -134.73 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4868 0.4864 0.4824 0.4582 0.4170 0.4692
F 1654.55 1680.42 1833.87 1714.89 1598.17 2040.461978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Coal -0.0452 0.0085 0.1045 0.0650 0.0521 0.0666
-1.31 0.23 2.97 ** 1.77 * 1.4 1.91 *
Size 0.0814 0.1048 0.0979 0.0869 0.0954 0.1005
27.87 ** 33.75 ** 32.57 ** 29.09 ** 31.47 ** 34.72 **
Labor -4.6110 -5.0082 -4.7412 -4.4213 -3.6176 -4.2649
-172.5 ** -173.48 ** -182.08 ** -176.08 ** -159.32 ** -189.48 **
Mat -3.1096 -3.3737 -3.3599 -2.9654 -2.2561 -2.9953
-125.74 ** -128.13 ** -135.45 ** -125.22 ** -101.35 ** -134.48 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4851 0.4858 0.4815 0.4571 0.4157 0.4684
F 1643.06 1671.02 1827.64 1706.86 1589.02 2033.17
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Science 0.0281 -0.0901 -0.0834 -0.1358 0.0081 -0.0148
0.55 -1.63 -1.53 -2.65 ** 0.15 -0.29
Size 0.0814 0.1048 0.0980 0.0871 0.0954 0.1005
27.86 ** 33.77 ** 32.61 ** 29.13 ** 31.47 ** 34.73 **
Labor -4.6109 -5.0082 -4.7413 -4.4207 -3.6174 -4.2649
-172.49 ** -173.49 ** -182.07 ** -176.08 ** -159.31 ** -189.47 **
Mat -3.1095 -3.3734 -3.3605 -2.9654 -2.2559 -2.9954
-125.74 ** -128.12 ** -135.46 ** -125.23 ** -101.35 ** -134.48 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4851 0.4858 0.4808 0.4571 0.4157 0.4684
F 1642.96 1671.22 1827.16 1707.13 1588.89 2032.93
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Regional Hub -0.0129 -0.0088 -0.0061 -0.0121 -0.0158 -0.0158
-1.37 -0.9 -0.65 -1.33 -1.74 ** -1.84 **
Size 0.0815 0.1048 0.0980 0.0870 0.0955 0.1006
27.88 ** 33.76 ** 32.59 ** 29.11 ** 31.49 ** 34.75 **
Labor -4.6110 -5.0082 -4.7413 -4.4210 -3.6175 -4.2651
-172.5 ** -173.48 ** -182.07 ** -176.08 ** -159.32 ** -189.49 **
Mat -3.1093 -3.3733 -3.3602 -2.9649 -2.2557 -2.9954
-125.73 ** -128.11 ** -135.44 ** -125.2 ** -101.34 ** -134.49 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4851 0.4858 0.4815 0.4571 0.4157 0.4684
F 1643.08 1671.08 1827.02 1706.77 1589.09 2033.15Table 3b: OLS Results 2 Note: **: 5 % significance, *: 10% significance
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Technopolis (subsidized only) -0.3406 0.0412 0.0429 0.0261
-3.37 ** 2.46 ** 3.27 ** 1.69 *
Size 0.0980 0.0869 0.0953 0.1004
32.59 ** 29.09 ** 31.45 ** 34.7 **
Labor -4.7415 -4.4207 -3.6173 -4.2649
-182.1 ** -176.08 ** -159.32 ** -189.48 **
Mat -3.3599 -2.9653 -2.2559 -2.9954
-135.45 ** -125.22 ** -101.36 ** -134.49 **
Number of Obs 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4816 0.4571 0.4158 0.4684
F 1827.83 1707.06 1589.59 2033.12
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Inteligent (subsidized only) -0.0694 0.0768
-1.43 4.9 **
Size 0.0955 0.1004
31.49 ** 34.68 **
Labor -3.6174 -4.2644
-159.32 ** -189.49 **
Mat -2.2565 -2.9963
-101.36 ** -134.55 **
Number of Obs 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4157 0.4686
F 1589.02 2034.58
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Inducement  -0.0192 0.0571 0.0127 0.0330 -0.0598 -0.0033
(subsidized only) -1.24 3.54 ** 0.87 2.16 ** -2.8 ** -0.15
Size 0.0814 0.1047 0.0979 0.0869 0.0955 0.1005
27.87 ** 33.73 ** 32.58 ** 29.08 ** 31.49 ** 34.73 **
Labor -4.6114 -5.0075 -4.7409 -4.4203 -3.6176 -4.2649
-172.5 ** -173.48 ** -182.03 ** -176.05 ** -159.33 ** -189.46 **
Mat -3.1094 -3.3742 -3.3604 -2.9656 -2.2558 -2.9954
-125.73 ** -128.17 ** -135.45 ** -125.23 ** -101.35 ** -134.48 **
Number of Obs 48040 48559 53655 57942 61726 66093
R-squared 0.4843 0.4859 0.4815 0.4571 0.4157 0.4684
F 1643.05 1671.95 1827.04 1706.97 1589.4 2032.92Table 4: ATT Results Note: **: 5 % significance, *: 10% significance
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Industrial Relocationinducement areas -0.30001 -0.2983 -0.2694 -0.2768 -0.2431 -0.2427
-20.86 ** -19.78 ** -18.75 ** -19.84 ** -18.09 ** -18.68 **
Subsidized areas -0.1946 -0.0649 -0.1616 -0.0972 -0.1946 -0.1558
-6.86 ** -2.22 ** -5.91 ** -3.32 ** -11.79 ** -8.05 **
Coal Mining Area 0.0128 0.0215 -0.007 -0.1318 -0.0094 -0.1425
0.26 0.46 -0.16 -2.75 -0.19 -2.88 **
Technopolis -0.0878 -0.081 -0.1708 -0.1197 -0.0864 -0.1058
-3.86 ** -3.34 ** -7.28 ** -5.42 ** -4.14 ** -5.1 **
Intelligent Location -0.061 -0.0914 -0.0927 -0.0951 -0.0904 -0.0803
-3.2 ** -4.65 ** -4.77 ** -5.33 ** -5.29 ** -4.68 **
Science 0.141 0.124 0.0486 0.0436 0.2257 0.0309
1.46 0.99 0.51 0.47 2.46 ** 0.35
Region -0.163 -0.1625 -0.1521 -0.1431 -0.125 -0.1314
-10.15 ** -9.46 ** -9.53 ** -9.34 ** -8.45 ** -9 **
moving-out 0.3097 0.2982 0.3039 0.254 0.2386 0.2404
18.93 ** 17.51 ** 18.04 ** 15.46 ** 14.64 ** 14.65 **
Note: "Inducement area" is defined as all regions specified in laws, while "Subsidized area" is defined as the regions which actually receive subsidy.Table 5: ATT Results and Endogeneity Note: **: 5 % significance, *: 10% significance
1980 1985 1990
Industrial Relocation inducement areas -0.10541 -0.10702 -0.09908
-4.18 ** -4.49 ** -4.5 **
Subsidized areas 0.02262 -0.0382 -0.08904
0.67 -1.09 -3.66 **
Coal Mining Area -0.03529 -0.15972 -0.20684
-0.73 -2.99 ** -3.94 **
Technopolis -0.00904 -0.05328 -0.04749
-0.34 -2.06 ** -1.88 *
Intelligent Location -0.05583 -0.06657 -0.0411
-2.4 ** -3.01 ** -1.91 **
Science -0.07146 -0.15111 -0.20742
-0.59 -1.42 -2.05 **
Table 6: ATT Results in Machinery Sector
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Technopolis -0.1989 -0.155 -0.2342 -0.0398 0.0057 -0.1965
-4.35 ** -3.82 ** -5.78 ** -2.33 ** 0.11 -5.77 **
Intelligent Location -0.1365 -0.1821 -0.0973 -0.1183 -0.0829 -0.0994
-3.99 ** -5.5 ** -2.84 ** -3.64 ** -2.77 ** -3.25 **
Table 7: ATT Results: Mother Cities Only
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Technopolis -0.0621 -0.041 -0.1206 -0.0502 -0.0551 -0.0656
-2.15 ** -1.32 -3.84 ** -1.68 * -2 ** -2.28 **
Intelligent Location -0.0649 -0.0803 -0.1312 -0.0613 -0.0568 -0.0594
-2.86 ** -3.33 ** -5.53 ** -2.85 ** -2.75 ** -2.83 **Table 8: ATT Results: Adjacent Regions Note: **: 5 % significance, *: 10% significance
1978 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Industrial Relocation inducement areas -0.2233 -0.1837 -0.1876 -0.205 -0.1865 -0.1937
-10.68 ** -8.42 ** -8.97 ** -10.36 ** -10 ** -10.55 **
Subsidized areas -0.0886 -0.1054 -0.0982 -0.0411 -0.051 -0.0687
-3.74 ** -4.4 ** -4.17 ** -1.78 * -1.7 * -3.06 **
Technopolis 0.1095 0.0783 0.0818 0.0397 0.1312 0.0079
3.38 ** 2.26 ** 2.3 ** 1.31 3.51 ** 0.29
Intelligent Location 0.0915 0.0582 0.0291 0.0267 0.0343 0.0373
3.27 ** 2 ** 0.99 1.59 1.37 1.48
Coal Mining Area -0.0113 -0.0058 0.1198 0.0492 0.052 -0.0842
-0.15 -0.08 1.5 0.64 0.66 -1.08
Science 0.1042 -0.0915 -0.2738 -0.2134 -0.1747 -0.0889
0.81 -0.7 -2.87 ** -2.28 ** -2.07 ** -0.97Appendix: Matching Results in a Representative Regression
Inducement subsidized area in 1990
Probit Regression Balance test
Coefficients z-value Mean
Size 0.0443 8.01 ** Treated Control t-test
Labor 0.1373 3.41 ** Size Unmatched 3.3528 3.2919 4.29 **
Mat -0.0649 -1.56 Matched 3.3528 3.3524 0.02
sec12 0.7190 1.43
sec13 0.5936 1.17 Labor Unmatched 0.24455 0.23741 3.57 **
sec14 0.5539 1.1 Matched 0.24455 0.24494 -0.15
sec15 0.6041 1.2
sec16 0.8241 1.63 Mat Unmatched 0.36531 0.3684 -1.54
sec17 0.3082 0.61 Matched 0.36531 0.36417 0.41
sec18 0.1126 0.22
sec19 0.0727 0.14 Note: In the matched sample, each variables should have no significant 














Const -1.6737 -3.32 **
R-squared 0.0301
Obs 66093
Untreated Sample 57616
Treated Sample 8477